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Abstract—Popular culture has contemplated societies of thinking machines for generations, envisioning futures from utopian to
dystopian. These futures are, arguably, here now—we find ourselves at the doorstep of technology that can at least simulate the
appearance of thinking, acting, and feeling. The real question is: now what?
✦
POPULAR culture has contemplated societies of think-ing machines for generations, envisioning futures from
utopian to dystopian. Visions of HAL and R2D2 have
excited our imagination and at the same time prompted
concerns about how these new entities will impact us and
our society at large. These futures are, arguably, here now—
we find ourselves at the doorstep of technology that can
at least simulate the appearance of thinking, acting, and
feeling. The real question is: now what?
Was this the future that Alan Turing famously envi-
sioned in 1950 when he created the Turing Test to tell
machines apart from human based on whether a machine
could fool a human that is interacting with it into thinking
it is human? Maybe and maybe not. Advanced uses of ML
and AI allow us to engineer programs that are capable of
outputting hyper-realistic communication, images or even
potentially full human personas. While there are numerous
positive uses of such technology, does it have darker impli-
cations if used with the intent to cause harm?
We take the example of sophisticated online bots able to
emulate human behavior and interact with us seamlessly.
As they make the distinction between authentic and fake
communication harder than it is already today, these sophis-
bots could have a profound impact on society by gradually
manipulating our trust in content like images or videos.
We argue why technical solutions, while important, should
be complemented with efforts involving informed policy
and international norms to accompany these technological
developments. Indeed, we believe it is essential to foster
increased civic literacy of the nature of ones interactions
with systems deploying ML to ensure a positive impact of
the advances they enable.
DO MACHINES CAPABLE OF PASSING THE TURING
TEST EXIST TODAY?
Machine learning can now emulate human behavior,
thought processes, and strategies, to the point of human
indistinguishability between humans and machines in cer-
tain contexts. Google’s Duplex system makes reservations
by conversing with humans over the phone. Here, learning
algorithms captured subtle artifacts of spoken English to
replicate human artifacts such as hesitations or pauses,
thereby generating speech that is very conversational and
lifelike. In another domain, Christie’s announced this past
summer that it was the first auction house to sell art gen-
erated by a neural network. This questions the necessary
involvement of human forms of creativity as a prerequisite
to producing art that is enjoyable to humans.
It is not hyperbole to suggest that such demonstrations,
that were until now exclusively associated with humans,
are only the first of many more to come. Machine learning
techniques are no longer limited to responding to inputs
created and curated by humans—like a request to place a
reservation. They are now capable of producing original
synthetic content completely from scratch using a class of
machine learning algorithms known as “generative”. This
area of research has in many ways been revolutionized
by a particular technique called GANs, which stands for
Generative Adversarial Networks [8]. GANs enable many
creative applications beneficial to society: they range from
automatically designing dental crowns that fit individual
patients correctly to augmenting the creativity of artists by
synthesizing musical notes.
The GAN framework involves two machine learning
models trained in a competing fashion. The first, called
the generator, learns how to produce synthetic inputs, e.g.,
images or videos. The second, referred to as the discrimi-
nator, learns how to classify inputs as being real or “fake”
(i.e., data output by the generator). This may remind the
reader of the Turing test. Indeed, the discriminator is or-
chestrating some form of weaker but automated imitation
game [19]. Assuming neither model wins this game early
in training, the discriminator gets better at telling apart
synthetic and real inputs while the generator gradually gets
better at producing synthetic inputs that the discriminator
finds harder to detect. We revisit this relationship between
the GAN framework and the imitation game later, since it
has implications for the (lack of) existence of automated
techniques for detecting machine-generated content.
It is exciting that scientific progress enables us to get
closer to building machines that may pass the Turing test.
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appear natural to humans has many positive applications:
for instance, the episode IX of Star Wars is set to include
the late actor Carrie Fisher. However, like with any tech-
nology, scientific progress made by researchers interested
in generative machine learning could enable potentially
less honorable applications by individuals with malicious
intentions to bully, blackmail, extort, defame, or mislead.
Take the example of research conducted by Suwa-
janakorn et al., in which they applied another type of
generative ML model called a recurrent neural network to
synthesize the face and voice of Barack Obama [17]. The
researchers were able to produce realistic video footage
of the former US president giving an address from a text
transcript of their choice. Although a careful human ob-
server will notice some minor inconsistencies in the videos
produced by the machine, it is clear that such a technique
could be leveraged by malicious individuals to increase the
sophistication of fake news spread by social media bots.
This was demonstrated, most likely without malicious in-
tentions, when a Belgian party created in May 2018 a video
of Donald Trump urging Belgium to follow the US and
withdraw from the Paris climate agreement. By circulating
this video on social networks, the party’s intent was to
generate attention and debate around the issue of climate
change. While the intention is likely not to deceive here,
releasing this video contributes to eroding confidence from
the general public in media. In another example, Yao et al.
showed that machine learning is capable of generating fake
Yelp reviews that humans not only confounded with real
reviews but also found just as useful [20].
In some way, this technology is close from passing a
Turing test, albeit a passive one where the human consumes
the machine’s outputs but is unable to query it with specific
inputs.
WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF ML EMULATING
HUMAN BEHAVIOR?
All of these discoveries and observations lead to a sin-
gle conclusion—we are rapidly reaching a point where
computational algorithms can create nearly any form of
human communication that is for all intents and purposes
indistinguishable from reality. Apart from the many obvi-
ous positive uses, such as telepresence or human-computer
interaction, what does this mean to us as a society and what
does it do to online (and offline) public discourse, politics,
due process, commerce, and society at large?
In the presence of individuals with malicious intent but
low technical sophistication, the issue is first one of forgery.
There is a history of written words and reported discourse
being forged. Forged letters claimed in 1777 that General
Washington thought the revolutionary war against Great
Britain was a mistake. After multiple decades of improve-
ments to the software created by Adobe, the expression “to
photoshop” is now a synonym for digitally altering images.
In short, the barrier to entry for manipulating content has
been decreasing for centuries. Progress in ML is simply
accelerating this process. Things that were less forgeable in
the past—such as voice or video when compared to written
words or photos—now are or soon will be.
We already have a substantial problem with forged and
out-of-context content—the Internet is plagued by fake re-
views, fake posts, and fake people fueling misinformation.
We now know that carefully crafted social media messages
were created to disrupt public discourse and influence
opinion prior to the 2016 US presidential election. Suppose
adversaries could automate this process and create such
content algorithmically, an hypothesis reinforced in the con-
troversial way researchers presented their recent results [16]
on natural language processing to the public. How does that
capability change the Internet and affect our society?
As the sophistication of adversaries increases, consider
the hypothetical but logical conclusion of content forgery—
a fake human we will refer to as a sophisbot. Here, the
sophisbot is a program running in the ether of social media
or other infrastructure. It never sleeps nor ages, and is not
bound by geography, culture or conscience. It can have opin-
ions, agendas, biases and can consume enormous amounts
of information and maintain nearly infinite number of si-
multaneous conversations. Sophisbots can have real visages
and personalities that will draw people to them.
Now take that same bot and give them a task. Such
tasks can be political, such as promoting one candidate over
others, sowing mistrust among citizens, spreading racist
or misogynistic propaganda, etc. Other tasks can be more
on the human-scale, such as harassing an at-risk teenager
into suicide, ruining personal relationships, or inducing a
victim into doing something financially or personally risky.
Perhaps less damaging but still raising ethical questions, the
bots could simply promote products or services. Sophisbots
would tirelessly use all the tools of forgery and social
engineering to achieve their goals. Older technologies pre-
viously transformed communication in similar ways: email
decreased the resources needed to craft sophisticated junk
mail that could reach millions of individuals. Now consider
that you can use machine learning to create billions of
sophisbots simulating fake humans in a matter of seconds.
Such bots are some distance from those we see to-
day. Nevertheless, Twitter-bots already generate fake-but-
widely-read forged content and retweet others. A 2017 study
by the Pew Research Institute shows that over half of the
links on Twitter were posted by automated accounts. This
reality was also observed in earlier academic studies [4] or
during the DARPA challenge on Twitter bots.
In short, while sophisbots would not introduce a new
problem, they would reinforce the existing issue of content
forgery by potentially providing scalability to existing tech-
niques for manipulating content. Adversaries have already
exploited existing online services driven by automated rea-
soning for such malicious ends. In one well publicized
example, Microsoft’s Tay chatbot was an online chat bot that
learned to speak (in part) from user queries. Adversaries on
the Internet quickly learned of the service and trained it to
post racist and inflammatory tweets [11]. The service was
shutdown within 24 hours of its launch.
The real question is how do we identify and possibly
eliminate these malicious bots and content from public
discourse?
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The central question is how do we defend against this form
of malicious activity. There are really two answers to this
question: science and policy. We first discuss the former.
We argue as a matter of science, machine learning
technology must evolve to make the systems and models
accountable and its inputs and outputs reliably identifi-
able [1]. Digital forensic techniques are actively being devel-
oped to detect manipulated content. For instance, specialists
commonly use the lack of camera-induced imperfections in
synthetic images and videos to identify them. Unfortunately,
the approach does not scale given the shortage of human
experts; unless their work can be in large parts automated
by technological solutions that identify content produced
or edited by machines. We explore three such potential
approaches, but stress that despite the partial progress they
afford, all three are quite limited. Our analysis thus suggests
that it is likely that there is no robust technological defense
against this problem.
Detecting artifacts of synthetic content
A natural first approach is to automate the process of digital
forensics and attempt to identify machine-manipulated con-
tent by detecting its imperfections. For instance, techniques
for manipulating videos often introduce specific video im-
perfections that can be detected. For instance, generators
that rely on deep learning to produce fake videos known
as deepfakes often operate by face-swapping. Body move-
ments and proportions are typically unchanged from the
stand-in actor. Techniques such as Eulerian Video Magnifi-
cation could help to identify human pulse in videos [5]. In
principle, a detector could identify a deepfake by detecting
these and other imperfections in the video. In fact, the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is
running a media forensics program called MediFor that is
funding research to develop robust detectors that operate
this way. Researchers are developing tools to detect deep-
fakes through physiological inconsistencies, such as detect-
ing an irregular eye blinking pattern, or lack of blinking
altogether [9]. To facilitate learning detectors for synthetic
content, researchers have also collected datasets of content
known to be the output of generative models [15].
While it may be possible to design an effective detector
against the current generation of deepfake generators, in
the long-run this is likely to be a losing battle or at best a
stalemate [6]. Indeed, detection in ML is even more likely to
result in an arms race than traditional system and network
anomaly detection. This is because ML algorithms devel-
oped to create synthetic content, such as GANs, involve by
design a generator trained to evade detection. This means
that as the detector gets better to tell apart synthetic from
natural content, so can the generator that creates synthetic
content. Every time a new detector is deployed, the genera-
tor can be re-trained to evade the new detector. Improving
the generator is efficient as long as enough information
about the discriminator can be quickly gathered. At every
iteration the generator gets better, as does the detector, but
this process may never converge to a setting that steadily fa-
vors the defender if retraining the generator continues to be
less costly than coming up with an improved discriminator
in this setting. For example, a detector that uses blinking to
identify deepfakes [9] could be effective on the short term,
but eventually it will likely drive the development of deep
fake generators that correctly emulate human eye blinking.
The end result is that sites hosting videos cannot rely on
the resulting detector to robustly identify fake videos in the
long term, at least not solely by analyzing the video itself. To
summarize, progress in generative model research is likely
to continue to give an edge to those creating fake content in
the long term. In the short term, this would very much re-
semble the status quo in signature-based malware detection
where defenders are constantly defining signatures for new
forms of malware.
Content provenance
The second approach seeks to improve the provenance of
human forms of digital communication. By provenance, we
mean building a secure record of all entities and systems
that manipulate a particular piece of content [10]. Consider
our deepfake example mentioned above. The goal of a
data provenance approach would be to identify deepfakes
as content that was digitally synthesized instead of being
captured using a camera. A fairly obvious solution would
be to equipe every digital camera with a tamper proof
cryptographic content signing key. The camera will use
the key to sign all video clips that it exports. This way,
every video clip is accompanied by a digital signature that
identifies the physical camera on which the clip was shot.
Such functionality is already available with applications
like Guardian Project’s ProofMode. Presumably, a deepfake
generator would be unable to sign a fake video because it
does not have the signing key embedded in the hardware
of a real video camera. However, due to key creation,
distribution, authentication, and other issues, implementing
this in practice would be logistically difficult. This would be
further complicated if the content is post-processed by users
(e.g., to crop or apply filters) because the edits will have to
preserve the image or video signature [12]. Alternatively,
one may be able to defeat the provenance system using the
“analog hole” attack—simply play an unsigned deepfake
video on a screen, and record the screen using an approved
camera that properly signs videos. In the absence of other
identifying factors like the physical location in the content
verified by the signature, it would most likely be difficult
to detect this attack from artifacts added by the screen, as
discussed previously.
Total accountability
The third technological defense is a regime of total ac-
countability. Consider a fictional public figure, Bernie, who
is concerned about fake videos, such as deepfakes, and
is willing to take extreme measures to protect himself. In
principle, Bernie could record every minute of his life on
a tamper proof camera that signs and timestamps all of its
captured videos. If a deepfake of Bernie is published, Bernie
could prove that at the purported time that the deepfake
took place, he was engaged in a slightly different activity.
This after-the-fact defense would not mitigate the potential
damage to Bernie’s public image, but would let Bernie prove
that the deepfake is a forgery. Of course, this cure may be
worse than the disease: the potential loss of privacy from
4this 24/7 self-surveillance may cause more harm than the
concern over deepfakes. In truth, we are fairly certain that
a different instantiation of total accountability is required to
avoid having every person create their own version of the
“Truman Show”.
Such an approach is in fact being explored within in-
dustry: a product called Amber Authenticate proposes to
have cameras periodically compute video signatures and
record them publicly on a blockchain. This does not require
sharing the actual content of the videos. Nevertheless, it is
then possible for anyone to access the hashes recorded on
the blockchain and, given video footage, verify that the hash
of this video footage corresponds to what was recorded on
the blockchain. This allows one to authenticate the video as
having been recorded by the camera at a certain date and
time—as claimed by the author of the video.
WHY IS EMULATED HUMAN BEHAVIOR A PROBLEM
THAT IS CHALLENGING TO SOLVE PURELY THROUGH
TECHNOLOGY?
It is clear from this discussion that technology alone cannot
address the challenges of fake content emulating human
behavior through machine learning. Furthermore, the very
involvement of humans sets out the potential limitations
of any solution addressing this problem purely through
technology. Take the example of fake news. Research has
shown that humans actively seek to reinforce their opin-
ions [3]. People will want to hear what they like to hear.
As a consequence, each one of us reinforces their bubble
of opinions through the selectivity and bias of our online
connections. This effect is more prevalent in certain demo-
graphics, age being the demographic characteristic observed
in a recent study to have the most significant effect on
sharing fake news with their online connections [7]. Even
if individuals attempt to fact check their opinions and break
out of a bubble of opinion, finding unbiased information
can be difficult [18] and have a limited effect on their
misperception [13].
This problem is not new but it is aggravated by the
scale and level of personalization afforded by generative
ML. Combined with large intentional or unintentional leaks
of private data describing traits of our personal preferences
and personalities, these techniques are instrumental in gen-
erating media that can effectively manipulate populations.
Does this mean we need to give up some forms of
anonymity? Social networks have already started providing
mechanisms to distinguish anonymous users from users
linked to real-world individuals. For instance, Twitter adds
a blue star next to users whose identity has been verified.
This verification is optional but recommended by Twitter
for populations often targeted by bots, such as journalists
or celebrities. Obviously, this will not solve the bubbles
of opinions. However, it could begin to address the crisis
of content authenticity that will result from increasingly
high exposure of Internet users to content generated by
machines. However, this is not a silver bullet. This loss of
anonymity, along with approaches for improving content
provenance, may have unintended negative consequences:
e.g., by enabling the tracking or identification of dissidents,
minorities, or otherwise vulnerable groups that might face
repercussions for content they created.
The key is however developing public policy, legal,
and normative frameworks for managing the malicious
applications of technology in conjunction with efforts to
refine it. Law and policy typically lag behind technological
innovation, because the implications of new technologies
and how to address them can take time to come into
focus and/or emerge as politically salient enough for policy
makers to pay attention to them. Asimov summarizes this
well: “Science gathers knowledge faster than society gathers
wisdom.” For the most part, this lag is a feature of a vibrant
innovation ecosystem, because it enables experimentation,
risk-taking, and freer exchanges of ideas and capital. It can
emerge as a bug, however, when innovation results in rapid
paradigm shifts in the relative symmetry between malign
offensive uses of technology and technological efforts to
defend against them—as the case was for information tech-
nology, and potentially now for ML. New technologies are
not always “penetration tested” from a policy perspective,
because the forces behind innovation often focus on the
positive applications and are not always incentivized to
think proactively about malicious applications, which are
easily cast aside as “somebody else’s problem, not mine.”
Here today, we see machine learning as creating numer-
ous policy challenges, some of which mirror many of the
past (and current) concerns, and others that are more novel
and may create opportunities. For example, what recourse
does a victim have when a fake video is created of them? In-
dividual companies already have complementary processes
in place to help users report and remove content from
their platforms, but how would they be applied to content
created via machine learning? What rights or options, if any,
do individuals have, as a practical matter, for protecting
their content from being consumed for the purposes of
future content being faked? What is the appropriate re-
sponse against governments who deploy the technology to
interfere with liberal democratic institutions? Even the basic
definition of content ownership becomes murky in this new
reality: are the data and algorithms created by machines
the property of individuals who designed and built these
machines or a collective holding of the individuals who
contributed the data that the machine was learned with?
Answers to these questions and many, many more are going
to shape our society and future. We simply cannot wait to
see the harms emerge before dealing with for them.
We argue for thinking comprehensively about the toolkit
for dealing with these and other potential harms, and for
disaggregating a given problem into as many smaller pieces
as possible. For example, in the case of manipulated videos
such as deepfakes, one approach to disaggregating the
problem is to organize our thinking around the different
actors with a stake in the matter, and identifying policy tools
aimed at nudging, shaping, or informing their behavior.
From this perspective, there are a number of different actors
whose behavior and decisions are relevant to fake content.
These include (among others) the authors of fake content;
authors of applications used to create fake content; owners
of platforms that host fake content software; educators who
train engineers in sensitive technologies; manufacturers and
authors who create platforms and applications for capturing
5content (e.g., cameras); owners of data repositories used to
train generators; unwitting persons depicted in fake content
such as images or deepfakes; platforms that host and/or dis-
tribute fake content; audiences who encounter fake content;
journalists who report on fake content; and so on.
Breaking down the problem in this way allows us to
think more creatively about the range of policy tools rel-
evant to the task at hand, puts us in a stronger position
to identify the right policy tool(s) for the job of shaping
the behavior of a given actor and, if and when necessary,
develop new tools. As is the case for research on the secu-
rity of computer systems, a precise threat model capturing
the goal and capabilities of actors relevant to the system
being analyzed is the first step towards principled defenses.
Ultimately, this approach has the potential to coalesce into
a more comprehensive strategy that aligns incentives across
the different actors. No single tool may prove decisive, but
a comprehensive approach that draws on multiple tools
affecting different actors could materially move the needle.
For instance, certain groups of would-be authors of
deepfakes—politicians, for example—could commit to not
depicting their rivals in deepfakes. In a democracy such as
the United States, we submit that many (and perhaps even
most) politicians would likely find a norm along these lines
attractive, under a mutual assured destruction sort of logic:
all things equal, most politicians in a democracy would
prefer to operate and campaign in a world where they and
their opponents do not resort to outright fabrications, as
opposed to one where such behavior is accepted. The U.S.
Congress or a state legislature could endorse a norm along
these lines in a joint resolution, and the legislative campaign
committees could do so as well, and even withholding
funding for candidates that violate the norm. Obviously,
some politicians and other political actors might reject or
violate such a norm. This would be even more concerning
in less democratic societies where totalitarian governments
may themselves be using ML to enable propaganda at scale.
Platforms could help by rejecting fake content along these
lines when they discover them, or at least downgrade them
in their promotion algorithms. Each of these measures, on
its own, is incomplete, but together they could have impact.
Of course, politics isn’t the only domain where fake con-
tent could gain traction. Bullies and extortionists will also
find uses for the technology. Here as well, an actor-centric
approach yields many possibilities. For example, legisla-
tures (or courts) could clarify that depicting a third person
in a deepfake without their consent is defamation; victims
would then have a cause of action for recovering money
damages from authors. Legislatures could also establish
criminal penalties, along the lines of legislation pending in
the California legislature. Some malicious authors will hide
their identities or may not have deep pockets, so holding
them liable is only a partial solution. Technical measures
may be useful in this context, despite their limitations.
Indeed, authors of software capable of producing deepfakes
could be incentivized to include cryptographic signatures to
aid detection of deepfakes, perhaps by holding developers
who do not include a signature liable for works created
using their software. App stores and other fora for acquiring
software could refuse to carry software that lacks this capa-
bility, and be incentivized to do so through mandates in
law or through civil liability. Obviously, software that lacks
such a capability will still be available elsewhere, but these
or other barriers could deter casual users while limiting the
options available to power users with malicious intentions.
Meanwhile, platforms that host content could be re-
quired to not only establish a procedure for receiving com-
plaints about deepfakes, as some have done voluntarily
already for content that violates their terms of service
or community standards, but to also provide a concise
overview of the principles behind such standards. The Fed-
eral Trade Commission could then hold the platforms ac-
countable to these published commitments using its unfair
trade practices authority. Platforms could also label content
known or suspected to be machine generated. Obviously,
the platforms could not label all machine generated content
as such for the technical reasons described above having
to do with false negatives and positives [2]. This balance
will be more difficult to achieve as many photo or video
editing tools are likely to start including some amount of
machine learning. Nevertheless, these labels could still be
useful in situations where the authenticity of the content is
of paramount importance to its authors and viewers. User
research will be useful here to find an implementation that
best ensures effective long-term user interaction with such
labels and avoids pitfalls such as the implied truth effect
on unlabeled content [14]. Educators who train the next
generation of engineers could elevate policy and ethical
literacy as important facets of technical education. And bol-
stering digital media literacy, especially for demographics
at highest risk of being deceived, is also essential. Indeed,
research has found that correcting misperceptions through
the presentation of factual evidence has limited effect, and
can sometimes be counterproductive by strengthening such
misperceptions [13].
We present these governance interventions to illustrate
how breaking the problem down in this way can yield
insights into the possibilities for shaping behavior. None of
these governance interventions is a silver bullet, in the same
way that the technical possibilities described above are not.
Some of them also raise other challenges or concerns, and
implicate difficult tradeoffs across other important values
or equities. In addition, determined bad actors will often
find ways around them. But for less determined bad actors,
interventions along the lines of what we describe above
from the technical and policy perspectives could prove
decisive if put in place jointly. And having to operate in
this governed environment would make it costlier for even
the determined bad actors to create and spread malicious
content.
CONCLUSION
As Turing envisioned in 1950, machines are on track to
become well capable of producing any form of human com-
munication. It is likely that they will eventually simulate
fake human behavior effectively and allow for the creation
of sophisbots. Perhaps one of the most pressing technical
questions for the first half of this century is thus how we
distinguish reality from the synthetic in our evolving world
of thinking machines. Answers to this question will shape
howwe as a broader society communicate and live long into
6the future. In that regard, the test that Turing envisioned in
1950 is more relevant than ever: will humans continue to be
able to identify sophisbots, albeit using increasingly higher
levels of knowledge and logic abstractions, until we are able
to create an artificial intelligence? The call is clear. Let us
as a technical community commit ourselves to embracing
and addressing these challenges as readily as we do the
fascinating and exciting new uses of intelligent systems.
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